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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lonnie Robert Johnson appeals from the judgment of conviction and 
order of restitution entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of grand theft 
by possession of stolen property and being a persistent violator of the law. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On October 19, 2007, Union Pacific Railroad ("UPR") Police Officer Dan 
Milovanovic responded to a report of a signal wire theft in Lincoln County. (Tr., 
p.123, L.24 - p.124, L.4.) Upon arriving at the location of the reported theft 
Officer Milovanovic observed cut wires hanging from a signal pole adjacent to 
the railroad tracks. (Tr., p.124, Ls.9-16, p.126, L.19 - p.127, L.3; Exhibit 2.) On 
the ground near the tracks the officer observed a pile of green ten-gauge copper 
signal wire that had been cut into three-foot sections and, right next to that, he 
observed a T-shirt with the initials "L.J." written on the collar. (Tr., p.124, Ls.16- 
20, p.127, Ls.10-18, p.129, Ls.16-21, p.130, Ls.18-21; Exhibits 3-5.) Upon 
further investigation of the area the officer found a footprint, fresh tire tracks, and 
a plastic bag containing two receipts issued from Pacific Steel and Recycling 
("Pacific Steel") to Lonnie Johnson. (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-20, p.127, L.19 - p.128, 
L.6, p.130, Ls.6-13; Exhibits 7-8.) The first receipt showed that Johnson sold 87 
pounds of copper to Pacific Steel on October 4, 2007, for $204.45. (Exhibits 8, 
14.) The second receipt showed that Johnson sold 97 pounds of copper to 
Pacific Steel on October 10, 2007, for $227.95. (Exhibit 8, 13.) 
On October 23, 2007, Officer Milovanovic went to Pacific Steel to 
investigate whether Johnson had sold UPR's signal wire to that company. (Tr., 
p.140, Ls.3-9, p.141, L.3 - p.142, L.1.) While there Officer Milovanovic observed 
small pieces of what he recognized as UPR's six-gauge copper signal wire in 
one of the scrap metal bins. (Tr., p.142, Ls.2-14; Exhibits 10-12.) The officer 
inquired about the wire and learned that Pacific Steel had purchased it from 
Lonnie Johnson for $232.65 on October 22, 2007. (Tr., p.142, L.7 - p.143, L.12; 
Exhibit 9.) The total weight of the wire Johnson sold on that date was 99 
pounds. (Tr., p.142, Ls.22-25; Exhibit 9.) After speaking with Pacific Steel 
employees and comparing UPR's six and ten-gauge signal wire to the two types 
of copper wire Johnson had sold' to the recycling company as scrap metal, 
Officer Milovanovic obtained a warrant to arrest Johnson for grand theft. (Tr., 
The next day, Officer Milovanovic received a report that a vehicle 
matching the description of Johnson's vehicle had been spotted near the railroad 
tracks in Lincoln County at the site of the previous theft. (Tr., p.152, L.12 - 
p.154, L.6, p.162, L.12 - p.163, L.2.) When Officer Milovanovic responded to 
the scene Lincoln County officers had already placed Johnson under arrest. 
(Tr., p.153, Ls.3-17.) Subsequent to Johnson's arrest, Lincoln County officers, 
assisted by Officer Milovanovic, found and recovered "quite a bit" of UPR's six 
and ten-gauge signal wire from the back of Johnson's vehicle. (Tr., p.153, L.5 - 
p.156, L.lO.) When questioned about the wire after waiving his ~iranda' rights, 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
Johnson told Officer Milovanovic that he had run over the wire while driving on 
the UPR right-of-way and decided to take it for the scrap value. (Tr., p.156, L.23 
- p.157, L . l l ,  p.161, L.23 - p.162, L.13.) Johnson admitted to the officer that he 
knew it was wrong to take the wire, but denied having actually cut the wire down. 
(Tr., p.162, Ls.13-23.) 
The state charged Johnson with grand theft by possession of stolen 
property in relation to the three batches of UPR copper signal wire he had sold to 
Pacific Steel between October 4 and October 22, 2007. (R., pp.41-43, 48-51.) 
The state also filed a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.48-51.) After a 
two day trial a jury found Johnson guilty as charged. (R., pp.178, 180: Tr., p.386, 
Ls.2-23, p.398, L.14 - p.399, L.22.) The district court entered judgment on the 
jury's verdicts and imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with five years fixed. 
(R., pp.205-09.) The court also entered an order requiring Johnson to pay 
restitution to UPR in the amount of $2000. (R., pp.218-20; Tr., p.457, Ls.15-19), 
the amount of money a UPR employee testified at trial it would cost to replace 
the stolen signal wire (see Tr., p.223, L.4 - p.231, L.5). Johnson timely 
appealed. (R., pp.210-14, 221-27.) 
ISSUES 
Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict 
of guilt on the charge of grand theft? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to properly instruct the jury 
that the State bore the burden of proof to establish that the 
market value was not ascertainable; in failing to instruct the 
jury that, in order to use replacement value, the State first 
had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
replacement cost offered by the State was for property that 
was similar in quality, design, and value as that alleged to 
have been stolen; and further err in instructing the jury that 
the State did not have the burden to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, facts other than those outlined by the 
district court? 
3. Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Johnson's 
constitutional right to present an adequate defense and to 
compulsory process, when the court excluded an 
exculpatory defense witness as a discovery sanction? 
4. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct rising to the level of a 
fundamental error when she referred to Mr. Johnson as a 
"scavenger" and a '"buzzard;" and when she 
mischaracterized the 'substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony 
during closing arguments? .. 
5. Did the district court err when the court awarded restitution 
in the amount of $2,000? 
6. Does proper application of the cumulative error doctrine 
require reversal in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.18.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Johnson failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in the jury 
instructions? 
2. Was there substantial competent evidence presented at trial from which 
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was guilty of 
grand theft by possession of stolkn property? 
3. Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
by excluding the testimony of a non-disclosed defense witness? 
4. Has Johnson failed to show that he is entitled to relief with respect to his 
appellate claims of prosecutorial misconduct? 
5. Has Johnson failed to establish an accumulation of trial errors warranting 
application of the cumulative error doctrine? 
6. Has Johnson failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's 
award of restitution? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, 
In The Jurv Instructions 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Johnson argues that the district court failed to 
properly instruct the jury regarding the state's burden of proof in relation to the 
value element of grand theft. (Appellant's brief, pp.29-34.) Specifically, he 
contends that the court was required to instruct the jury that, before the jury 
could consider replacement cost as the appropriate measure for determining the 
value of the stolen wire, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that: (1) the market value of the stolen wire could not be satisfactorily 
ascertained; and (2) "the replacement cost proffered by the State was for 
property reasonably close in quality, design, and value" to the stolen wire. 
(Appellant's brief, p.31.) He also argues that the court erred by instructing the 
jury that the state was not required to prove every fact in evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (Appellant's brief, pp.31-33.) Johnson's claims of 
instructional error fail, however, because he did not raise them below and he has 
failed on appeal to demonstrate error, much less fundamental error entitling him 
to review of his claims for the first time on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether the jury instructions, when considered as a 
whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a 
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. 
m, 129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Jones, 125 
ldaho 477, 489, 873 P.2d 122, 134 (1994). If the instructions given, taken as a 
whole, fairly and accurately reflect the law, there is no error. State v. Stricklin, 
136 ldaho 264, 267, 32 P.3d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 2001). To be reversible error, 
any error in the jury instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the 
complaining party. State v. Row, 131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 
(1998); State v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 560, 564, 861 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
C. Johnson Has Not Properlv Preserved Or Presented His Claim Of Error In 
The Juw Instructions Because He Did Not Raise It Below And Has Not 
Shown That The Error He Claims On Appeal Is Fundamental 
Ordinarily, a party may not "assign as error the giving of or failure to give 
an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider 
its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the 
grounds of the objection." I.C.R. 30(b). However, even absent a timely objection 
in the trial court, claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on 
appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 
748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). "An error is fundamental only when it 'so 
profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the 
accused of his fundamental right to due process."' Iri, (quoting State v. Lavy, 
121 ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992)). Before the appellate court will 
engage in a fundamental error analysis, the appellant must establish that the trial 
court committed an error. Anderson, 144 ldaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 891. 
Johnson asks this Court to review his claims of instructional error under 
the fundamental error doctrine, claiming that, as given, the jury instructions in 
this case "affirmatively relieved the State of its constitutional obligation of proof' 
with respect to the value element of grand theft. (Appellant's brief, p.31.) 
Johnson has failed to show the fundamental error doctrine is applicable to this 
case because he has failed to show an error "so egregious that it produced 
manifest injustice by violating [his] due process rights." Anderson, 144 ldaho at 
749, 170 P.3d at 892. 
A jury instruction violates due process if it "fails to give effect" to the 
requirement that "the State must prove every element of the offense" beyond a 
reasonable doubt. & The district court correctly instructed the jury as to the 
elements of the offense and the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (R., pp.156, 167-68; 173 (Instruction Nos. 4, 13, 13-A, 13-C, 
13-F, attached hereto as Appendices A-E).) That Johnson believes the 
instructions could have been more detailed does not establish the instructions 
were "so egregious" as to produce manifest injustice in violation of his due 
process rights. Anderson, 144 ldaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. Johnson has, 
therefore, failed to demonstrate any fundamental error entitling him to review of 
his claim for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this Court reviews Johnson's instructional error claims, he has 
failed to show error. While the state undoubtedly has the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that burden only extends to each essential element 
of the offense for which the defendant is being tried, see Stricklin, 136 ldaho at 
268, 32 P.3d at 162, and to any fact that increases the maximum sentence the 
court can impose, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (any fact 
that increases sentence beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakelv v. Washinqton, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004) ("statutory maximum" for purposes of Apprendi is the maximum the judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the verdict or guilty plea). 
Contrary to Johnson's arguments on appeal, the court's instructions in this case 
correctly communicated the state's burden. 
Johnson was charged with grand theft by possession of stolen property. 
The district court correctly instructed the jury on the state's burden of proof and 
the essential elements of this offense. In addition to instructing the jury at the 
outset of the trial that the state bore the burden of proving Johnson guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt (R., p.156 (lnstruction No. 4, attached hereto as Appendix 
A)), following the presentation of evidence, the court gave lnstruction No. 13, 
which clarified the state's burden of proof as follows: 
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be 
carried by the State of Idaho d,o not require the State to prove 
every fact and every circumstance put in evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The burden of proof extends only to the 
material elements of the offense. These material elements are set 
forth in the following instruction. 
(R., p.167 (Instruction No. 13); Appendix B.) Immediately following lnstruction 
No. 13, the court gave lnstruction No. 13-A, setting forth the statutory elements 
of theft by possession of stolen property. (R., p.169 (Instruction No. 13-A); 
Appendix C.) The court then instructed the jury in lnstruction No. 13-C as to the 
elements the state must prove to establish that Johnson was guilty of grand 
theft, as follows: 
If the evidence shows that the defendant took, obtained, or 
withheld property by theft at various times from the same person; 
and that the value of the property taken in each theft was one 
thousand dollars ($1000) or less; and that the property was taken, 
obtained, or withheld pursuant to one overall intent or plan to 
commit a series of thefts; then you are to add together the values 
of all the property taken, obtained, or withheld pursuant to that 
overall intent or plan. If the total value of such property is more 
than one thousand dollars ($1000), then the crime is Grand Theft. 
The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a theft is grand theft. If a theft is not grand theft, then it is petit 
theft. 
(R., p.179 (Instruction No. 13-C); Appendix D.) Finally, consistent with I.C. 33 
18-2402(1 ?)(a) and ( I  l)(c) and lCJl 575, which relate to value, the district court 
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 13-F that: 
The term "value" as used in these instructions means as follows: 
The market value of the property at the time and place of the 
crime, or if the market value cannot be satisfactorily 
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a 
reasonable time after the crime. 
When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained 
pursuant to any of the above standards its value shall be deemed 
to be one thousand dollars ($1000) or less. 
(R., p.173 (Instruction No. 13-F); Appendix E.) 
Despite having failed to object to these instructions or to request any 
additional instructions below (see Tr., p.302, L.8 - p.303, L.10), Johnson argues 
on appeal that these instructions were insufficient to convey to the jury the 
state's burden of proof regarding the value element of grand of theft because 
they did not specifically inform fhe jury that, before the jury could rely on 
replacement cost as the measure of value for the stolen wire, the state was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the market value of the wire 
could not be satisfactorily ascertained; and 2) the replacement cost proffered by 
the state was for property reasonably close in quality, design, and value as that 
alleged to have been stolen (Appellant's brief, p.31). Johnson is incorrect. 
Although the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the value of the property stolen exceeds $1000 in order to convict Johnson of 
grand theft, the state was not required to prove by that same quantum of proof 
the method by which the jury was required to ascertain that value because the 
method of valuation is not an essential element of the offense. Neither 
Apprendi, supra, nor Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), compel a contrary 
conclusion. Apprendi merely holds that any fact that increases a defendant's 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490. That the state has the 
burden of proving the element of value beyond a reasonable doubt does not, 
however, mean that the state must prove every single fact relevant to that 
element beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the state must prove or disprove 
value by a particular theory. ~pprend i  does not require otherwise. 
Johnson's reliance on Mullaney is likewise misplaced. At issue in 
Mullaney was whether a Maine law which required the defendant, who was 
charged with murder, to prove he acted in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation, in order to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter, violated due 
process. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684-85. The United States Supreme Court 
concluded such a law did violate due process and ultimately held that it was the 
state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of 
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a 
homicide case. Id. at 703. While the Court discussed the differences in possible 
penalties between murder committed without provocation and murder committed 
with provocation, the Court's opinion in relation to who had the burden of proof 
was not dependent on the potential penalties. Rather, the Court's holding was 
based upon criminal culpability and intent, which the state clearly has the burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. j& at 696-701. The logic of Mullaney 
regarding the state's burden of proof on the element of intent, however, hardly 
extends to an obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the appropriate 
method of valuation in a theft case. Mullaney certainly does not require such, 
and Johnson has provided no persuasive argument that the constitutional 
principles articulated in Mullaney require the state to do so. 
Johnson also relies on a Montana case, State v. Ohms, 46 P.3d 55 (Mont. 
2002), and a Florida case, Robinson v. State, 686 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1997), for the proposition that a trial court must instruct the jury that the 
state has the burden of proving the proper method of valuation beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (Appellant's brief, pp.25, 31 .) Ohms and Robinson are both 
sufficiency of the evidence cases in which the court concluded the state failed to 
meet its burden of proving the value necessary to convict the defendant of grand 
theft or felony theft. Although both cases hold the state has the burden of proof 
in relation to value, Ohms, 46 P.3d at 58, Robinson, 686 So.2d at 1373, neither 
goes so far as to hold that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that market value cannot be ascertained such that the jury may properly 
rely on replacement value. 
Moreover, there is no ldaho case that imposes such a requirement. In 
fact, the only ldaho case that offers any guidance on this issue appears to 
suggest otherwise. In State v. Huahes, the ldaho Court of Appeals addressed 
the issue of value in the context of a claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove the defendant was guilty of felony malicious injury to property. State v. 
Huqhes, 130 ldaho 698, 702-04, 946 P.2d 1338, 1342-44 (Ct. App. 1997). The 
court, after sumeying cases from other jurisdictions on the proper method for 
quantifying value, adopted the following approach: 
Either the diminution of the object's fair market value or the 
reasonable cost of repair is a fair means of measuring damage 
when the offender has harmed but not destroyed the property. If 
the State applies the diminution of value measure, then it must 
establish the fair market value of the property immediately before 
and after the damage. 
When the cost of repair is chosen, this measure may not 
exceed the market value of the item before the damage, for an 
offender cannot cause an economic loss that surpasses the actual 
value of the property damaged. The defendant may challenge the 
cost of repair measure, therefore, by presenting evidence of a 
lesser fair market value. 
When property has been entirely destroyed, neither the cost 
of repair measure nor the diminution in value measure are 
applicable. The proper measure of damages in such event is the 
fair market value of the property at the time and place of its 
destruction. 
In some cases the destroyed item may have no market 
value or the value may not be ascertainable. Therefore, upon a 
showing that fair market value cannot be established, the State 
may show the economic value of the loss caused by the defendant 
through such factors as original purchase price, replacement cost, 
the property's general use and purpose, and salvage value. 
Hughes, 130 ldaho at 1343, 946 P.2d at 1343 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted, emphasis added). 
Nowhere in Hughes did the court suggest, much less hold, that the state 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the method by which the 
jury must calculate value. To the contrary, the court's use of the words "a 
showing" indicate proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in relation to 
whether market value is ascertainable such that replacement value can be used 
instead. This conclusion is consistent with the state's ability to prove value by 
either diminution of fair market value or reasonable cost of repair. Huahes, 130 
ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d at 1343. if the proper valuation method was an essential 
element requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the state would not have the 
ability to make such an election. 
There is additional language in Hughes that also undermines Johnson's 
claim that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the 
replacement cost proffered by the State was for property reasonably close in 
quality, design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen," in addition to 
proving the replacement value exceeded $1000. (Appellant's brief, p.31.) 
Specifically, the court in Huahes stated, "If the State attempts to prove value 
through replacement cost, however, we think it incumbent upon the State to 
produce some evidence that the replacement item is of a quality and design 
comparable to that of the destroye'd item." 130 ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d at 1343 
(emphasis added). "Some evidence" fails far short of implying that the evidence 
must be sufficient to satisfy the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See 
also Bembrv v. State, 273 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. App. 1980) (rejecting -
defendant's claim that the trial court was required to instruct the jury "on 'the 
method of calculating the value of the damage to personalty;" and concluding the 
trial court's instructions that it was the state's burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense as charged in the 
indictment and that the crime charged was defined as the "intentional infliction of 
damage to the property of another in excess of $100" "was a full and adequate 
charge on the issue of damages as it related to the issue before the jury"). 
Even if, as Johnson asserts, the state is required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the market value is not ascertainable and that the 
replacement value is for "property reasonably close in quality, design, and value 
as that alleged to have been stolen," there is no basis for concluding that the 
instructions given in this case did not adequately communicate that burden. As 
indicated above, the court clearly advised the jury that it was the state's burden 
to prove each element of grand thefi, including value, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. (R., pp.167-68 (Appendices B, C).) Johnson nevertheless contends, for 
the first time on appeal, these instructions were inadequate, because lnstruction 
No. 13 regarding the scope of the reasonable doubt instruction did not 
specifically reference lnstruction No. 13-F, which defined value, lnstruction No. 
13-F did not include a reasonable doubt instruction, and lnstruction No. 13 
"affirmatively informed the jury that the State did not have to prove a fact beyond 
a reasonable doubt unless the district court instructed them that this burden 
existed for that fact." (Appellant's brief, pp.32-33.) All of Johnson's arguments 
lack merit. 
Although lnstruction No. 13 does not specifically reference lnstruction No. 
13-F (Appendix E), the instruction defining value, the jury was instructed in 
lnstruction No. 13-C (Appendix D) that the state had the burden of proving value 
in excess of $1000 beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find Johnson guilty of 
grand theft. (R., p.170 (Appendix D).) lnstruction No. 13-F (Appendix E) 
informed the jury how to reach that determination. There is no reason to believe 
the jury considered those two instructions separately when deciding whether the 
state had satisfied its burden of proof in relation to value. Indeed, by finding 
Johnson guilty of grand theft, the jury necessarily found the market value could 
not be satisfactorily ascertained such that reference to the replacement cost of 
the property was necessary. The failure to include another reasonable doubt 
instruction within or in relation to lnstruction No. 13-F was not required to 
adequately communicate the state's burden of proof. See State v. Boetger, 96 
Idaho 535, 537, 531 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1975) (rejecting defendant's argument 
that court erred in declining to give a separate reasonable doubt instruction 
regarding value since the state's burden of proving value beyond a reasonable 
doubt was already communicated in another instruction). 
Inclusion of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement in 
lnstruction No. 13-C (Appendix D) also eliminates any possibility that the jury 
concluded the reasonable doubt standard did not apply to value simply because 
lnstruction No. 13 (Appendix B) only referred to the elements instruction. 
Johnson's claim that a "similar instruction was criticized" in State v. Rossianol, 
2009 WL 1637035 (Ct. App. 2009), is misleading. The instruction at issue in 
Rossianol stated, in relevant part: 
The State must prove all the material elements of the offense 
charged in the Information to be true beyond a reasonable doubt 
before the defendant can be found guilty. In order to help you in 
your duties as jurors I am going to outline for you the elements of 
the crime for which the defendant has been charged. 
The State must prove that on unknown dates between January, 
[sic] 2005 and September, [sic] 2005 in ldaho that Mr. Rossignol 
did commit lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age 
as described in three of the counts against him and that he sexually 
abused a child as described in the remaining count. 
It is not necessary for the state to establish every fact and 
circumstance put in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is 
necessary to sustain a conviction that the facts and circumstances 
in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the material elements of the offense that I have 
outlined. 
Rossianol at *I4 
The court's criticism was not in relation to the portion of the instruction, 
similar to lnstruction No. 13 regarding the scope of the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard; in fact, this type of instruction is "a true and accurate 
statement of the law." Stricklin, 136 ldaho at 268-69, 32 P.3d at 162-63. Rather, 
the court's criticism was based upon the trial court's "unfortunate choice of the 
phrase 'outline for you the elements of the crime"' since the court apparently 
failed to actually outline the elements. Rossiqnol at *14. Such criticism does not 
apply here. The court did exactly as it instructed the jury it would do in 
lnstruction No. 13 - it followed that instruction with lnstruction No. 13-A, which 
set forth the material elements of the offense. 
The jury instructions in this, case viewed as a whole, fairly and accurately 
reflect the law and the state's burden of proof. Johnson's claims fail to establish 
the instructions were erroneous much less resulted in a due process violation 
entitling him to challenge the instructions for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this Court considers Johnson's instructional error claims for the 
first time on appeal, and finds the instructions erroneous, any error is harmless. 
In determining whether the error is harmless, the "inquiry [is]: is it clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (finding trial 
judge's failure to instruct on the element of materiality harmless given that "no 
jury could reasonably find that Neder's failure to report substantial amounts of 
income on his tax returns was not 'a material matter" since the "evidence 
supporting materiality was so overwhelming"); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 
497, 503 (1987) ("While it was error to instruct the juries to use a state 
community standard in considering the value question, if a reviewing court 
concludes that no rational juror, if properly instructed, could find value in the 
magazines, the convictions should stand."); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) 
(concluding harmless error analysis applies to instruction that impermissibly 
shifted the burden of proof on malice); State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182, 
191 P.3d 1098, 1102 (2008) (holding "the omission of the element that the 
property taken be financial transadions cards is harmless error" given the jury's 
conclusion that the defendant tookiand withheld property, which was the victim's 
wallet, and the uncontroverted evidence that the wallet contained financial 
transaction cards), 
In light of the evidence presented at trial on the issue of value, which is 
set forth in detail in Section II, infra, this Court can conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that even if the jury had been instructed as Johnson claims 
they should have been, the jury would have found Johnson guilty of grand theft. 
Thus, even if Johnson has demonstrated fundamental error in relation to the jury 
instructions, he is not entitled to relief because any error was harmless 
II. 
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The 
Jurv Found Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Johnson Was Guiltv Of Grand 
Theft Bv Possession Of Stolen Property 
A. Introduction 
Johnson argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence at trial 
to establish that the value of the stolen signal wire exceeded $1000, the statutory 
threshold for grand theft. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-28.) Johnson's argument 
fails. A review of the record and the applicable law shows that the state 
presented substantial competent evidence at trial from which the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the stolen wire Johnson possessed 
exceeded $1000 and, as such, Johnson was guilty of grand theft. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 ldaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 ldaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting -
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
ldaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); m, 112 ldaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hushes, 130 ldaho 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); m, 112 ldaho at 761, 735 
P.2d at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury 
Reasonably Found That The Value Of The Stolen Wire Exceeded $1 000 
Johnson argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence that the 
value of the stolen wire exceeded $1000. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-28.) 
Johnson's argument is based upon three equally faulty assertions: ( I )  the 
state's "evidence demonstrated that there was, in fact, a market value for the 
copper wires and also established the value of the wires according to this 
standard;" (2) "[tlhere was insufficient evidence . . . that market value could not 
be satisfactorily ascertained" such that the jury could properly consider the 
replacement costs (Appellant's brief, p.23), and (3) the "replacement value 
proffered by the State . . . [was] not for property that was similar in quality, 
I 
design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen" (Appellant's brief, p.28). 
Contrary to Johnson's assertions, a review of the correct legal standards and the 
evidence presented at trial reveals the state submitted substantial, competent 
evidence from which the jury could conclude the market value of the stolen wire 
was not readily ascertainable such that replacement value could be considered 
in calculating value, and the evidence of replacement costs presented to the jury 
exceeded $1000, and were properly relied upon for purposes of determining 
value. Johnson's sufficiency of the evidence claim, therefore, fails. 
The jury was instructed, consistent with I.C. § 18-2402(1 ?)(a), that value 
means "[tlhe market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if 
the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of 
the property within a reasonable time after the crime." (R., p.173 (Appendix E).) 
With respect to the value of the wire stolen by Johnson, the state presented 
evidence from Douglas Richard, the manager of signal maintenance for Union 
Pacific Railroad who is responsible for purchasing wire, that replacement wire 
costs 25 cents per linear foot and that the wire must be purchased in "a reel of 
2,000 linear feet," which contains 71 pounds of wire and costs $500. (Tr., 
p.220, L.17 - p.221, L.2, p.227, Ls.5-14, p.228, L.25 - p.229, 1.24.) Because 
Mr. Richard could only purchase the replacement wire in 71 pound reels, he 
would have to purchase four reels to replace the 283 pounds of wire stolen by 
Johnson for a total replacement cost of $2000. (Tr., p.230, L.1 - p.231, L.5.) 
This evidence was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the value 
of the stolen wire exceeded the $1000 requirement necessary to find Johnson 
guilty of grand theft. 
Johnson first claims the foregoing evidence was not sufficient because, he 
asserts, "the State's own evidence demonstrated that there was, in fact, a market 
value for the copper wires and also established the value of the wires according 
to this standard," which was the scrap value Johnson received when he sold the 
copper wire taken from the railroad's signal wire. (Appellant's brief, p.23.) 
Johnson's argument in this regard rests upon the faulty premise that the state, 
for purposes of proving value in a grand theft case, is restricted to the market 
value for the wire when sold as scrap as opposed to the value of the wire as a 
functioning whole. Several courts have rejected similar claims 
For example, in State v. Cope, 438 P.2d 442 (Ariz. App. 1968), the 
defendants were charged with grand theft for stealing the copper wire from inside 
an electrical transformer, which wire was valued at $30.00. The transformer, 
with the wire included, was valued at $117.00. fi at 443. On appeal, the 
defendant argued, inter alia, that "the value of $1 17.00 for the transformer may 
not be considered as defendants were not charged with stealing the transformer 
itself, but merely the wire from the inside." fi The court rejected this 'argument, 
reasoning: 
We must . . . assume as established by the evidence, that the 
transformer was nothing more than a hollow shell of insignificant 
value once the copper forming the coils therein was removed. By 
defendants' act the transformer was reduced to a shell by the 
removal of wire which had an intrinsic value of only $30.00. The 
act of destruction was done to suit the convenience of the 
defendants in that it was the copper wire which they wanted as it 
had a ready market at the salvage yard. There can be no question 
but that the owner suffered the loss of the transformer valued at 
$117.00. The defendants feloniously deprived the owner of the 
article itself by removing the principal thing of value which was in it. 
In all logic, it was the value of this copper wire in place that was 
taken from the owner. It was not simply copper wire of only 
intrinsic value that was stolen, but rather wire which, by reason of 
its patterned arrangement and design served special functions and, 
as such, had a special value. 
It is apparent that while copper wire has an intrinsic value of 
approximately thirty-seven cents per pound as scrap, when it is in 
place in certain complex equipment its value is greatly enhanced. 
A person stealing an item with such a special value cannot claim 
that since he could get only the ordinary price for the parts, he is 
not guilty of theft of the higher amount. 
Cope, 438 P.2d at 444. 
The Oregon Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in State v. 
-, 242 P. 11 16 (Or. 1926), stating: 
The question of the value of personal property is of twofold 
importance. First, stolen property must have a value in order to be 
the subject of larceny. Second, that value should be shown in 
order to determine the degree of the offense. To go a step further: 
In cases wherein the stolen property is smashed or rendered 
useless for its original purpose, the value of such property is not its 
value after having been demolished or broken up, but is its value at 
the inception of the taking thereof. Thus, in the case at bar, the 
value of the property was not its value as scrap iron after the 
defendant had broken up the equipment, but was its market value 
at Newberg[, the city from where the property was stolen,] 
immediately prior to its destruction by him. The act of the 
defendant in breaking the equipment into pieces in order to enable 
him to handle it with less difficulty than in its original state 
constitutes a part of his wrongful act in the taking thereof. 
m, 242 P. at 11 18 (citation omitted). 
Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with Cope and m. See, 
Q, McClure v. State, 673 S.E.2d 856, 857-58 (Ga. App. 2009) (in determining 
restitution, the victim is entitled to the fair market value of the copper including 
value of the wire harnesses in which part of the copper was contained, not just 
what the copper wire was worth as scrap metal); State v. Helms, 418 S.E.2d 
832, 833 (N.C. App. 1992) (value of stolen pay telephone not limited to amount 
of money in phone, but included replacement cost); State v. Landlee, 513 P.2d 
186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (jury could conclude stolen copper wire valued in 
excess of $100.00 based on testimony that replacement cost was $110.00 and 
market value was $170.00 to $180.00 even though scrap value was only $30.00) 
Johnson's claim that "[olther jurisdictions have . . . indicated that, where 
there is proof of the price received by the defendant for selling wires alleged to 
have been stolen, this proof is competent to establish the market value of the 
wire" greatly overstates the content of the cases upon which he relies in support 
of this claim. (Appellant's brief, p.23.) In Greene v. State, 406 So.2d 805 (Miss. 
1981), the defendant complained on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing 
testimony regarding the cost or value of stolen copper wire because, he 
asserted, the testimony was hearsay. 406 So.2d at 808. The Mississippi 
Supreme Court found no error noting the substance of the witness's testimony 
"was that he had sold scrap copper wire to different buyers at different times for 
different prices." id. This conclusion hardly stands for the proposition that 
market value is the same as scrap value for purposes of determining the 
sufficiency of evidence in relation 'to the degree of theft for which a defendant 
may be convicted. 
Johnson's reliance on State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
Loddv v. State, 502 P.2d 194 (Wyo. 1972), and Dyba v. State, 549 S.W.2d 178 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977), for his claim that market value is no more than scrap 
value is also misplaced. In a, the defendant claimed the value of the copper 
wire he stole was improperly valued because, he asserted, "the value of the 
copper wire was greatly increased when its insulation was burned off and 
transported from Millard County to Salt Lake City," where it was worth more. 763 
P.2d at 813. The court found Ott's argument "unpersuasive," concluding that 
even if it "adopted defendant's argument, and valued the wire in its insulated 
form, the evidence establishes that the value exceeds the $250 statutory 
requirement." Id. 
In Loddy, the "[dlefendant argued that neither of the witnesses who 
testified as the value of the copper wire was qualified, and therefore their 
opinions should not have been received in evidence." 502 P.2d at 197. The 
court denied relief on this claim due to Loddy's failure to object but noted that the 
witness "was competent to testify as to the value of the wire, and this constituted 
sufficient evidence of the value of the property to be submitted to the jury." Id. 
Finally, at issue in DVba was whether the state failed to demonstrate that 
stolen oxygen cylinders were worth $50.00 or more. 549 S.W.2d at 179. A 
witness testified that he sold the cylinders for $59.50. Id. at 180. Dyba 
nevertheless "insist[ed] . . . that the market value was not proved, and, therefore, 
the value of the cylinder is to be ascertained according to its replacement cost." 
Id. The court rejected Dyba's argument, finding "[mlarket value was -
demonstrated," therefore, under Texas law, there was no need to ascertain 
replacement value. Id. 
Neither Greene, Ott, Loddy nor Dvba support Johnson's claim that market 
value is limited to scrap value. Conversely, Cope, Albert, and the cases 
consistent with their holdings provide sound reasoning why market value should 
not be limited to scrap value, particularly where the defendant's actions have 
rendered the item valueless as anything other than scrap. Applying this logic to 
the facts of this case, the state in this case was not required to utilize scrap value 
as the market value for the wire stolen in its functioning form. Johnson's claim 
to the contrary fails. 
Johnson's claim that "[tjhere was insufficient evidence . . . that market 
value could not be satisfactorily ascertained" likewise fails. (Appellant's brief, 
p.23.) Mr. Richard testified that even if the railroad could recover some of the 
stolen wire, it is "not a good practice" to use wire that has been "chopped up" 
because it has to be "sleeve[dIn together. (Tr., p.224, Ls.9-16.) Moreover, Mr. 
Richard testified the railroad is required to purchase wire through their "supply 
system" where he is "given a few choices," but he has "to pick one of those." 
(Tr., p.221, Ls.11-15.) This is adequate evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that there is no market for signal wire that has been destroyed by 
removing the copper wire such that replacement cost was the appropriate 
method of valuation. Beasley v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1960), is 
instructive on this point. 
In Beasley, the defendant was charged with larceny for stealing copper 
wire "which was used in the block signal system" by the Illinois Central Railroad 
Company. 339 S.W.2d at 180. With respect to value, the evidence presented at 
trial was "the testimony of an employee of the railroad that the purchase cost of a 
similar quantity of new wire would be $37.89; that used wire with the insulation 
on it has practically no market value, but with the insulation burned off it can be 
sold as scrap." Id. at 181 (emphasis original). The court found this evidence of 
value sufficient to sustain Beasley's conviction, stating: 
For the purposes of a grand larceny prosecution the value of 
the stolen property is not the original cost nor the sale price for 
junk, but evidence of such cost or price is admissible as tending to 
establish the value. The true criterion is the fair market value of the 
property at the time and place it was stolen, if there be such a 
standard market; if not, the value must be arrived at from the facts 
and circumstances and the uses and purposes which the article 
was intended to serve. In other jurisdictions evidence of 
replacement cost has been held admissible in the absence of an 
established market value. 
In view of the fact that the wire here in question had no 
practical market value, the evidence of its replacement cost was 
admissible. There was nothing in the evidence to show that the 
wire was in a deteriorated condition, and it may be considered a 
matter of common knowledge that copper wire has a long period of 
useful life. Therefore the jury reasonably could conclude, from the 
fact that new wire would cost $37.89, that the stolen wire was worth 
at least $20 [as required in order to convict Beasley of grand 
larceny]. 
Beasley, 339 S.W.2d at 181 (citations omitted). 
Helms is also analogous. 418 S.E.2d 832. The state charged Helms with 
larceny for stealing a pay phone having a value in excess of $400. 418 S.E.2d at 
832. A witness from the telephone company "testified that the cost of replacing 
the telephone and enclosure would be $1,542" and that "he could not state a 
market value of the stolen property." Another witness also "testified that he 
was not aware of a market or market value for the stolen property." Id. at 832- 
33. On appeal, the defendant claimed there was "insufficient evidence that the 
stolen property had a fair market value over $400." Irl, at 833. The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed, holding: 
[where stolen property is not commonly traded and has no 
ascertainable market value, a jury may infer the market value of the 
stolen property from evidence of the replacement cost. In the 
present case, there was no evidence of "market value" of the stolen 
property with the exception of the $162.50 contained in the 
telephone. However, evidence was presented that the telephone 
and enclosure were not common articles having a market value 
and that the replacement cost of the items exceeded $1,500. 
The court in Helms also noted "[olther jurisdictions have held that where 
the stolen property has a unique or restricted use and there is no ascertainable 
market value, replacement cost may be considered in determining value." Irl, 
(citing State v. Day, 293 A.2d 331 (Maine 1972); People v. Renfro, 250 
Cal.App.2d 921, 58 Ca.Rptr. 832 (1967); State v. Randle, 410 P.2d 687 (1966); 
Clark v. State, 197 S.W.2d 111 (1946)). 
As in Beasiey and Helms, there was sufficient evidence presented in this 
case from which the jury could reasonably conclude there was no practical 
market for the signal wire once it was cut in pieces and had the copper wire 
removed from it. As such, it was appropriate for the jury to assess value by 
,: 
reference to the replacement costs. 
Johnson's final argument in relation to value is that the "replacement 
value proffered by the State . . . [was] not for property that was similar in quality, 
design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen." (Appellant's brief, p.28.) 
This argument, like Johnson's other arguments regarding value, fails. As an 
initial matter, it is questionable whether the requirement that the "replacement 
item [be] of a quality and design comparable to that of the destroyed item" 
translates to items like signal wire, w h i ~ h  is not a consumer good like the garage 
door at issue in Hughes where the Court of Appeals first articulated the state had 
an obligation to "produce some evidence" of such. 130 ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d 
at 1343. The state certainly understands the principle that a victim's choice of a 
replacement "may bear little or no relationship to the quality and value of the 
destroyed property, and the classification of the offense as a misdemeanor or a 
felony should not turn upon the victim's choice between a higher quality, more 
expensive replacement and a lower quality, more modestly priced item." 
However, where, as here, the victim has effectively no choice in its replacement 
options, such a principle is not relevant. 
Even if the comparable quality and design principle is relevant here, the 
state presented evidence that the replacement wire was "of a quality and design 
comparable to that of the destroyed item." Huahes, 130 ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d 
at 1343. Specifically, Mr. Richard testified he buys "one type of line wire . . . a 
number ten gauge covered line wire" (Tr., p.227, Ls.5-7), that the wire he buys 
has to comply "with certain codes the railroad sets," and the "line wire has to be 
a certain strength" (Tr., p.221, L.23 - p.222, L.2). Further, Officer Milovanovic 
testified the stolen wire came from line wire, which included "number ten signal 
wire." (Tr., p.124, Ls.10-18; see also Tr., p.133, Ls.12-14.) From this evidence, 
the jury could conclude that due to railroad specifications for signal wire, the 
replacement wire was of a comparable quality and design suitable to the purpose 
for which it was used. 
Johnson, however, argues the state's evidence actually demonstrated the 
contrary, i.e., that "there were significant differences in the quality and design of 
the wire alleged to have been taken and the wire used to calculate replacement 
cost." (Appellant's brief, p.27.) A review of the testimony Johnson relies on in 
support of this argument reveals otherwise. On cross-examination, Mr. Richard 
testified as follows: 
Q: Okay. Now what is -- I imagine there is a significant 
difference between these two wires and the wires you would 
replace them with? 
A:. There is a difference, yes 
Q: These two wires are very old? 
A: I would say that's correct. 
Q: The green tinted wire is obviously a little corroded? 
A: That's correct, oxidized copper, yes 
Q: Yes. And the brown tinted wire, you can see that there is 
actually some insulation still left on there that's falling off? 
A: Old tape and braid insulation, yes, ma'am 
Q: So tape and braid, that's fiber and tar, is that also accurate? 
A: That's probably a good explanation. 
Q: Okay. So we've got two very old kinds of wire that -- would 
you say that these wires have less value than what you are 
replacing them with? 
A: I wouldn't say they had less value. 
A: I mean, I'm not an expert on that. To me I guess I'm not -- 
Q: You're not a scrap metal dealer? 
A: There you go, there you go, yeah. 
(Tr., p.235, Ls.1-25.) 
Contrary to Johnson's characterization of this testimony, Mr. Richard did 
not testify there was a "significant difference" between the two wires, he merely 
acknowledged there was "a difference." Moreover, nothing about Mr. Richard's 
testimony establishes the differences were meaningful in terms of value. In fact, 
he specifically disagreed that the old wires had less value. That the wires may 
have lesser value as scrap says nothing about the comparative value of new wire 
versus old, intact wire. Indeed, the fact that the wires were old does not mean 
they were not as functional as the new wire. In fact, Mr. Richard testified the 
railroad replaces wire when it is destroyed or stolen, notably omitting any need to 
replace the wire simply because it was "old." (Tr., p.220, Ls.17-24.) Thus, to the 
extent the comparable quality and design principle is relevant to this case, the 
jury could easily conclude from Mr. Richard's testimony that the replacement wire 
satisfied this requirement. 
The state met its burden of presenting substantial, competent evidence 
from which the jury could, and did, conclude that Johnson stole signal wire with a 
value in excess of $1000, the statutory minimum for grand theft. Johnson has 
failed to establish otherwise. 
111. 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
Bv Excludinn The Testimony Of A Non-Disclosed Defense Witness 
A. Introduction 
After the state rested, Johnson's counsel requested permission to add to 
the "defense witness roster" a previously undisclosed witness, James Arterburn. 
(Tr., p.240, L.16 - p.241, L.3, p.252, L.24 - p.253, L.3.) According to defense 
counsel, Mr. Arterburn was the brother of Randy Arterburn, a man whose name 
appeared along with Johnson's on the October 22, 2007 receipt from Pacific 
Steel. (Tr., p.240, Ls.17-20; see also Exhibit 9.) Defense counsel advised the 
court that the defense had known about James Arterburn and had tried to locate 
him before trial, but had "been unsuccessful until he walked into the courtroom 
[that] morning." (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-8; see also Tr., p.240, Ls.16-24, p.253, L.22 - 
p.254, L.7.) Defense counsel further advised the court that, if allowed to testify, 
Mr. Arterburn would be expected to testify that he saw "two rolls of wire behind 
[Johnson's] brother's house," which, according to defense counsel, would 
corroborate Johnson's yet to be given testimony that at least some of the copper 
signal wire he sold to Pacific Steel came from his brother's house. (Tr., p.241, 
Ls.4-9, p.254, Ls.10-23.) He would also be expected to testify that he gave 
Johnson permission to use Randy Arterburn's name in connection with 
Johnson's sale of copper wire to Pacific Steel on October 22, 2007. (Tr., p.241, 
Ls.7-9.) 
When asked by the trial court whether the state had any position 
regarding the defense's request to call James Arterburn as a witness, the 
prosecutor objected, explaining: 
I have never been made aware of the fact that defense counsel 
was searching for any other witnesses in this case. I could see that 
possibly they would look for Randy Arterburn, whose name 
appears on one of the receipts that came from Pacific Steel and 
Recycling, but I have no knowledge of this witness. l did speak 
with him out in the hallway. I think this is extremely late discovery 
and the state has already rested. I don't believe that the witness 
should be allowed to testify. 
(Tr., p.253, Ls.9-20.) The prosecutor also advised the court that she had served 
upon the defense a standard request for discovery under Idaho Criminal Rule 
16. (Tr., p.255, Ls.3-7.) 
After hearing argument from both parties, the district court denied 
Johnson's request to call James Arterburn as a witness. (Tr., p.255, L.12 - 
p.256, L.17.) The court explained: 
Well based upon the representation that discovery was 
requested under Rule 16 by the state to the defense, which means 
that the prosecutor requested the defendant to furnish the state a 
list of names and address the defendant intends to call at trial, I'm 
going to not permit the calling of Mr. Arterburn. I find that the 
disclosure of him at this juncture is way beyond late. 
It's not an issue of whether Mr. Arterburn could be found or 
not. The issue is whether he could be called as a witness. I would 
assume that that knowledge was well within the province of the 
defendant in this case long ago. Whether Mr. Arterburn could 
actually be produced as a witness is not the issue. I think the state 
is entitled to notice of that and I think at this juncture having rested 
their case, that there is no reasonable basis for excusing the 
disclosure of that potential witness. 
All witnesses are potential witnesses. Some of them are 
called and some of them aren't. The standard is [sic] whether I'm 
really going to call that witness to trial or whether I can really get 
that witness to court or not, we would have an issue under Rule 16 
that has never been an issue for me before that has been 
contemplated and I don't think that that's the standard. 
It is the court's discretion to impose sanctions with regard to 
discovery violations. The pretrial order in this case required 
disclosure of witnesses to be completed long ago. I'm not going to 
permit Mr. Arterburn to testify in this case. 
(Tr., p.255, L.12-p.256, L.17.) 
Johnson argues on appeal that .the district court abused its discretion by 
excluding Mr. Arterburn's testimony, contending that the court improperly 
excluded the testimony without requiring the state to show that it was prejudiced 
by the late disclosure, without balancing the prejudice to the state against 
Johnson's right to a fair trial, and without considering less severe remedies for 
the late disclosure than exclusion. (Appellant's brief, pp.35-40.) Johnson has 
failed to show any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to show 
from the record either that the district court abused its discretion or that he was 
actually prejudiced by the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of 
an appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court." State v. 
Huntsman, 146 ldaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing 
v. Allen, 145 ldaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). See also 
State v. Anderson, 145 ldaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). "[TJhe trial 
court's exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court 
unless it has been clearly abused." State v. Stradley, 127 ldaho 203, 208, 899 
P.2d 416, 421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 ldaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495, 
496 (1977)). 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Excludina Mr. Arterburn's Testimony 
Rule 16 of the ldaho Criminal Rules requires a defendant, upon written 
request of the prosecuting attorney, to furnish the state a list of names and 
addresses of the witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial. I.C.R. 16(c)(3). 
A written response to the state's discovery request must be served within 14 
days of service of the request. C R  16(e)(l) The failure to timely comply with 
the request is grounds for the imposition of sanctions. I.C.R. 16(e)(2). 
When deciding whether to exclude a defense witness as a sanction for a 
discovery violation, the trial court must "balance the prejudice to the State due to 
the lateness of disclosure against the defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. 
Martinez, 137 ldaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State 
v. Miller, 133 ldaho 454, 457, 988 P.2d 680, 683 (1999); State v. Harris, 132 
ldaho 843, 846-47, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (1999); State v. Lamphere, 130 
ldaho 630, 633-34, 945 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1997)). The court must also consider "less 
severe remedies ... that might serve as an alternative to excluding the evidence." 
State v. Saxton, 133 ldaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
State v. Winson, 129 ldaho 298, 303, 923 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Ct. App. 1996); 
Harris, 132 ldaho at 846, 979 P.2d at 1204). Contrary to Johnson's argument on 
appeal, application of these principles to the facts of this case shows the district 
court properly exercised its discretion in excluding Mr. Arterburn's testimony as a 
sanction for Johnson's failure to have disclosed him as a witness before trial. 
In deciding whether to exclude Mr. Arterburn's testimony the district court 
clearly determined that the state was prejudiced by the lateness of the 
disclosure. (Tr., p.255, L.20 - p.256, L.4.) This determination is supported by 
the record which shows that, despite having known about Mr. Arterburn before 
trial, Johnson never disclosed him as a potential witness in response to the 
state's pretrial request for discovery and waited, instead, to spring him as what, 
at least according to defense counsel, was in essence an alibi witness on the 
second day of trial, after the state had rested its case. (Tr., p.240, L.16 - p.241, 
L.9, p.253, Ls.5-8, p.253, L.22 - p.254, L.23.) In addition to being extremely 
suspect, the timing of this disclosure was also inherently prejudicial to the state 
who, as explained by the prosecutor, had no prior knowledge that Mr. Arterburn 
even existed, much less that he was a potential witness in the case. (Tr., p.253, 
Ls.11-20.) If, as defense counsel asserted, Mr. Arterburn could corroborate 
certain details of Johnson's testimony regarding his procurement of the stolen 
wire, it was incumbent upon Johnson to disclose his name before trial to allow 
the state its own opportunity to attempt to contact him and investigate the facts 
underlying his proposed testimony. See State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 899 
P.2d 416 (1995) ("Our rules contemplate that counsel must make a good faith 
determination of the witnesses to be called and do so at a time when meaningful 
discovery can be conducted."). His failure to do so deprived the state of any 
meaningful opportunity for discovery and was prejudicial. 
Relying on State v. Lamphere and State v. Harris, supra, Johnson argues 
that the lateness of the disclosure of Mr. Arterburn as a witness was not 
sufficient by itself to sustain the court's finding of prejudice to the state. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.38-40.) While the state agrees that Lamphere and Harris 
both hold that exclusion of a defense witness based solely on the lateness of the 
disclosure of that witness is improper, the state submits that the facts of 
Lamphere and Harris are distinguishable and do not compel a finding that the 
district court abused its discretion in this case. 
This is not a case, like Lamphere, where the defense witness was 
disclosed to the state several days before trial. See Lamphere, 130 ldaho at 
632, 945 P.2d at 3. Nor is it a case, like Harris, where the failure to disclose the 
witness before trial was entirely inadvertent. See Harris, 132 ldaho at 845, 979 
P.2d at 1203. To the contrary, the record in this case shows, and the district 
court found, that Johnson knew about Mr. Arterburn well before trial, but 
consciously failed to disclose him as a potential witness until he showed up on 
the second day of trial, after the state had rested its case. (See, generally, Tr., 
p.240, L.16 - p.241, L.9, p.252, L.24 - p.256, L.17.) While Johnson's conduct 
may not have risen to the level of a willful violation2 of the discovery rules, it was 
While it is certainly suspicious that Mr. Arterburn just happened to show up at 
trial immediately before the defense was to begin its case in chief, the state 
acknowledges that there is no evidence in the record that would support a finding 
that Johnson's failure to disclose Mr. Arterburn as a witness was "willful," i.e. 
"motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the 
effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence," 
State v. Martinez, 137 ldaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct. App. 2002); see 
also State v. Huntsman, 146 ldaho 580, 587 n. 3, 199 P.3d 155, 162 n. 3 (Ct. 
App. 2008), nor did the district court make such a finding in this case. 
nevertheless egregious and justified the court's finding of prejudice to the state. 
Johnson also argues that, in excluding Mr. Arterburn as a witness, the trial 
court "failed entirely" to balance any prejudice that might be suffered by the state 
against Johnson's right to a fair trial, and also failed to consider alternative 
sanctions. (Appellant's brief, pp.39-40.) The state disagrees. Although the 
court did not explicitly articulate that it had considered the impact exclusion of 
Mr. Arterburn's testimony would have on Johnson's right to a fair trial or whether 
lesser sanctions would have been sufficient to remedy the prejudice to the state, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not actually consider 
these factors before deciding to exclude Mr. Arterburn's testimony. The court 
clearly perceived its decision as one of discretion. (Tr., p.256, Ls.13-14.) That 
the court exercised that discretion in favor of exclusion shows, at least implicitly, 
that the court did not believe such exclusion would seriously undermine 
Johnson's right to a fair trial. The record and applicable law support this 
determination because, although defense counsel asserted that Mr. Arterburn 
could corroborate certain aspects of Johnson's testimony, she failed to make any 
showing that Mr. Arterburn's testimony would actually be "relevant or helpful to 
the defense in any significant way." State v. Thomas, 133 ldaho 800, 992 P.2d 
795 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas is instructive. Thomas was 
charged with kidnapping a man with whom his ex-wife had a relationship. 133 
ldaho at 801-02, 992 P.2d at 796-97. On the second day of trial, after Thomas 
had testified and the defense had rested, defense counsel moved to reopen his 
case to present additional testimony from Thomas and also to call Thomas' ex- 
wife as a witness. & at 802, 992 P.2d at 797. According to defense counsel, 
the nature of Ms. Thomas' testimony would have been to impeach statements 
made by the victim, to discuss contacts she had with the victim after the charged 
incident, to discuss the circumstances of Thomas' arrest, and to identify the 
clothing Thomas was wearing on the night in question. The prosecutor 
objected to the request to present Ms. Thomas' testimony because she had not 
been disclosed as a witness and because, in reliance on defense counsel's 
pretrial representation that she would not be called, the prosecutor had not 
secured the attendance of three witnesses who he anticipated would be needed 
to rebut Ms. Thomas' testimony. ki. Finding that the state would be prejudiced, 
the trial court refused to allow Ms. Thomas to testify. Id. 
On appeal from his conviction, Thomas challenged the exclusion of Ms. 
Thomas' testimony, arguing that the trial court had failed to adequately consider 
his right to a fair trial or alternative sanctions. & at 803, 992 P.2d at 798. The 
Court of Appeals found Thomas' argument unpersuasive, reasoning: 
Proffered evidence must be relevant and possess some 
probative value to exculpate the defendant or to rebut the 
State's case before the defendant's request to present the 
evidence can have any weight to be balanced against 
prejudice to the State. Here, the defense presented no offer of 
proof or description of the proposed testimony that would indicate 
its relevance; rather, defense counsel merely described, in the 
vaguest terms, the general subject matter that would be addressed 
by the testimony. He stated that Ms. Thomas would impeach [the 
victim's] testimony about what happened on the night of the 
offense, but Ms. Thomas was not present during the kidnapping 
and thus could offer no first-hand knowledge of those events. 
Defense counsel also said that Ms. Thomas would testify regarding 
Thomas' clothing on the night of the offense, the circumstances of 
his arrest, and her contacts with [the victim] after the kidnapping. 
However, the facfs to which Ms. Thomas would testify were not 
described, and counsel's obscure description of the intended 
testimony demonstrates nothing of any relevance or exculpatory 
value. In short, the defense made no showing that the exclusion of 
the testimony would have any adverse effect on Thomas' right to a 
fair trial. 
Id. (bold emphasis added). Because Thomas failed to make any showing in the -
district court that Ms. Thomas' testimony "would have been relevant or helpful to 
the defense in any significant way," the Court of Appeals concluded Thomas had 
failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony. 
Id. -
In this case, as in Thomas, Johnson failed to make any showing in the 
trial court that the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony would have had any 
adverse effect on Johnson's right to a fair trial. Like defense counsel in Thomas, 
Johnson's defense counsel presented no offer of proof, but merely described in 
general terms the anticipated subject matter of Mr. Arterburn's testimony, as 
follows: 
He would be expected to testify that he saw the two rolls of wire 
behind Lonnie's brother's house. He went with him the day that he 
went to get the trailer, and also that he gave him permission to put 
his, that roll, the deposit on the 22nd on the account owned by 
himself and his brother. 
(Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel argued that Mr. Arterburn's testimony was 
"important to help the jury get a full picture of what happened, to help them get 
an accurate picture of where the wire that's subject to this case came from and 
whether or not Mr. Johnson knew that it was stolen." (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-$4.) 
Defense counsel failed, however, to demonstrate that any of the proposed 
testimony was actually helpful to the defense or relevant to rebut the state's 
case. 
The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Johnson sold copper wire to 
Pacific Steel on three separate occasions in October 2007. (Exhibits 8, 9, 13, 
and 14.) Officer Milovanovic and a Pacific Steel employee identified the wire 
Johnson sold as UPR number six and number ten signal wire, based upon the 
wires' distinctive characteristics. (Tr., p.124, Ls.10-20, p.142, L.4 - p. 147, L.21, 
p.196, L13 - p.204, L.21.) Johnson testified that, when he sold the wire to Pacific 
Steel, he did not know the wire was UPR signal wire and did not know or have 
reason to believe that it was stolen. (Tr., p.273, L.23 - p.274, L.13, p.299, L.8 - 
p.300, L.7.) Specifically, with respect to the first two batches of wire he sold, 
Johnson testified that 'he had found the wire, in two rolls, behind his deceased 
brother's house. (Tr., p.262, L.8 - p.263, L.24.) Johnson admitted finding the 
third batch of wire near the railroad tracks. (Tr., p.288, Ls.11-16.) He also 
testified that James Arterburn was with him when he sold the third batch of wire 
to Pacific Steel on October 22, 2007, and that Mr. Arterburn told the man at 
Pacific Steel to use Randy Arterburn's (James Arterburn's brother) name on the 
receipt. (Tr., p.288, 1.17 - p.289, L. 13.) 
While James Arterburn's testimony, as described by defense counsel, 
may have corroborated Johnson's testimony regarding both the existence of two 
rolls of wire behind Johnson's brother's house and the fact that Mr. Arterburn 
gave Johnson permission to use Randy Arterburn's name on the receipt for the 
third wire sale, neither of these facts were relevant to the jury's ultimate 
determination regarding Johnson's knowledge and intent to dispose of stolen 
property. Defense counsel stated that Mr. Arterburn would testify he saw two 
rolls of wire behind Johnson's brother's house, but there is no indication in the 
record regarding the timing of that observation in relation to Johnson's first and 
second sales of wire. Nor is there any indication that Mr. Arterburn had any first- 
hand knowledge regarding the origin of the rolls of wire he observed, or even 
that the wire he observed was the same wire Johnson sold to Pacific Steel on 
October 4 and October 10, 2007. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Arterburn was 
present and permitted Johnson to use Randy Arterburn's name on the receipt for 
the sale of wire on October 22, 2007, is entirely irrelevant to the issue of 
Johnson's knowledge and intent. Even by Johnson's own account, Mr. Arterburn 
was not with Johnson when he obtained the third batch of wire and, as such, 
could not testify to any fact necessary for the jury to conclude, one way or the 
other, whether Johnson knew or had reason to know that the wire was stolen. 
(Tr., p.288, L.11 -p.289, L.18.) 
In short, Johnson's defen& counsel, like defense counsel in Thomas, 
made no showing that the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony would have any 
deleterious effect on Johnson's right to a fair trial. Because Mr. Arterburn's 
proposed testimony was not relevant to exculpate Johnson or to rebut the state's 
case, the district court did not err in excluding it. Thomas, 133 Idaho at 803, 992 
P.2d at 798. Johnson has failed to show an abuse of discretion 
D. Even If Error, The Exclusion Of Mr. Arterburn's Testimony Was Harmless 
"'Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test is whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have 
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 ldaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 ldaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991)). The district court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding Mr. Arterburn's testimony. However, even if error, the exclusion of the 
testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable probability under the 
facts of this case that the exclusion contributed to Johnson's conviction. 
First, for the reasons set forth above, Mr. Arterburn's testimony was not 
relevant to any issue to be decided by the jury. Because Johnson made no 
showing that the exclusion of the testimony would have any deleterious effect on 
the fairness of his trial, any error in its exclusion was harmless. See State v. 
Saxton, 133 ldaho 546, 989 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1999) (trial court's failure to 
perform required balancing test before excluding evidence was harmless where 
defendant made no showing that evidence sought to be introduced was 
relevant). 
Second, if, as asserted by 'defense counsel, the purpose of Mr. 
Arterburn's testimony was to corroborate Johnson's testimony that he procured 
the first two batches of wire from his brother's residence, such testimony would 
largely have been cumulative of other evidence already presented at trial. As 
pointed out by defense counsel during her closing argument, Pacific Steel 
employee Russell Cornia testified regarding conversations he had with Johnson 
in which Johnson told him he had obtained the wire from his deceased brother. 
(Tr., p.201, Ls.1-25, p.344, Ls.1-4.) Because the jury had already heard 
Johnson's version of events from a state witness, the exclusion of Mr. 
Arterburn's testimony could not reasonably have contributed to the verdict. See 
State v. Sadier, 95 Idaho 524, 532, 511 P.2d 806, 814 (1973) (evidence that is 
"merely cumulative" is harmless and not a basis for reversal). 
Finally, even assuming Mr. Arterburn's testimony was not entirely 
irrelevant or cumulative, its exclusion was nevertheless harmless in light of the 
overwhelming evidence of Johnson's guilt. Officer Milovanovic found Johnson's 
belongings at the scene of the signal wire theft and subsequently positively 
identified the copper wire Johnson sold to Pacific Steel as UPR number six and 
number ten signal wire. (Tr., p.124, L.2 - p.125, L.20, p.124, Ls.10-20, p.142, 
L.4 - p.147, L.21, p.196, L13 - p.204, L.21.) The next day, officers 
apprehended Johnson at the scene of the signal wire theft and found "quite a bit" 
of UPR number six and number ten signal wire in his vehicle. (Tr., p.152, L.12 - 
p.156, L.22.) When questioned about that wire, Johnson admitted he knew it 
was wrong to take it. (Tr., p.162, Ls.6-15.) This evidence, though mostly 
circumstantial, overwhelmingly pointed to Johnson's guilt. Given the weight of 
the evidence, any error in the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony could not 
reasonably have affected the outcome of the case and was therefore harmless. 
Johnson has failed to show any basis for reversal. 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish That He Is Entitled To Relief With Respect To 
His Appellate Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Johnson did not object at trial to the prosecutor's closing argument. 
Nevertheless, he contends on appeal that the prosecutor made comments 
during her closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.42-48.) Johnson's argument fails, however, because he has failed to 
show that the prosecutor's arguments amounted to fundamental error, much less 
that they deprived him of a fair trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper 
closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct "'only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious to 
result in fundamental error."' State v. Severson, 2009 WL 1492659, * I7  (2009) 
(quoting State v. Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)), 
rehearing denied. Such error is fundamental only if it is "calculated to inflame 
the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant, or is 
so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors 
outside the evidence." State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 
(1994). More specifically, "[p]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments 
will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so egregious or 
inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a 
ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be 
disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 
2001). 
Even if fundamental, an error is harmless, and therefore not reversible, if 
the court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have 
been reached had the error not occurred. Id. at pp. 25-26. Thus, a mere 
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or 
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by 
the United States Supreme Court: "[llt is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwri~ht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."); State v. Reynolds, 120 
ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate 
review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any 
such misconduct did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial") 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor's 
Concluding Remarks 
After discussing in detail the elements of grand theft by deception of 
stolen property and the evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor made the 
following remarks near the conclusion of her closing argument: 
On a new note, ladies and gentlemen, the railroad is a long 
celebrated industry, but it is definitely in decline. There is a lot of 
competition out there these days. There is [sic] semis, boats, 
planes, and most of all technology, but that doesn't make it okay for 
thieves to be targeting railroad property. Railroad lines are not for 
scavengers and that is what the defendant is. He is a scavenger. 
He is a buzzard. He is picking off the bones of the railroad 
industry. 
(Tr., p.330, L.25 - p.331, L.8.) Johnson argues on appeal that "the prosecutor's 
remarks about the celebrated nature of the railroad industry, and its current 
vulnerability due to its state of industrial decline, were in no way based on any 
evidence that was admitted at trial," and, he speculates, "[tlhe only purpose for 
such argument is to arouse and evoke the jury's sympathies." (Appellant's brief, 
p.45.) He also argues that, combined with the prosecutor's reference to Johnson 
as a "buzzard" and "scavenger," "these remarks were so inflammatory as to rise 
to the level of fundamental error." (Id.) Johnson is incorrect. 
First, contrary to Johnson's assertion, the prosecutor's reference to the 
celebration and decline of the railroad industry was not improper argument 
merely because it was not based on any evidence presented at trial. 
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the right to 
discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from therefrom. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. 
Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The purpose of 
the prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors 
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450, 
816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). However, not every word a prosecutor 
utters during closing argument must be based on the evidence presented at trial. 
It is well accepted that a prosecutor, like defense counsel, "may make remarks, 
not based on the record, which concern matters of general knowledge and 
experience" Revnolds, 120 ldaho at 450, 816 P.2d at 1007 (citing ABA Standard 
9 5.9), and, in so doing, "may resort to poetry, cite fiction, reference anecdotes or 
tell jokes" Id. (citing J. Stein, Closing Argument 3 12, at 23 (1990)). Because 
there can be no question, in light of continuing and well known advancements in 
the transportation industry, that the decline of the once celebrated railroad 
industry is a matter of general knowledge and experience, the prosecutor's 
anecdotal reference to it was not error, much less fundamental error that 
deprived Johnson of a fair trial. 
Second, also contrary to Johnson's assertion on appeal, there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the prosecutor's remarks about the celebration and 
decline of the railroad industry were designed to "arouse and evoke the jury's 
sympathies." (Appellant's brief, p.45.) While it is undoubtedly improper to invite 
the jury to convict based on sympathy for the victim, see, e.a., State v. Severson, 
2009 WL 1492659, *21 (2009); State v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 
483 (Ct. App. 2008), a review of the prosecutor's argument, in context, shows 
she did not invite the jury to do so in this case, see Reynolds, 120 ldaho at 450, 
816 P.2d at 1007 ("[Tlhe propriety of a given argument will depend largely on the 
facts of each case."). 
Immediately before making the complained of comments, the prosecutor 
had taken the jury painstakingly through the jury instructions, the elements of the 
charged crime, and the trial evidence that proved Johnson's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (Tr., p.316, L.18 - p.330, L.24.) After spending nearly her 
entire argument outlining the elements and the proof, the prosecutor ultimately 
asked the jury to find Johnson guilty, not because the railroad industry is in 
decline, but because the evidence showed he stole over $1000 of copper signal 
wire from the railroad. (See Tr., p.331, Ls.17-20 ("Don't let this defendant 
minimize his actions. Hold him fully accountable for what he did. Find the 
defendant guilty of grand theft by possessing stolen property.").) Given this 
context it is clear that the prosecutor's reference during her concluding remarks 
to the state of the railroad industry in general was not an inflammatory appeal for 
the jury to render its decision on anything other than the evidence presented at 
trial. Johnson has again failed to show error, much less fundamental error that 
deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Adams, 2009 WL 1522666, "6 (Ct. App. 
2009) (prosecutor's request for justice for victims not inflammatory appeal to 
convict on anything other than evidence and, therefore, not fundamental error, 
where remarks came immediately after description of how the trial evidence 
proved Adams' guilt). 
Finally, the prosecutor's reference to Johnson as a "buzzard" and a 
"scavenger," while potentially unflattering, was not so egregious or inflammatory 
as to rise to the level of fundamental error. See State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 
496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999) (reference to defendant as "murdering 
dog" improper, but did not rise to level of fundamental error). Unlike the epithet 
"murdering dog" uttered by the prosecutor Hairston, the words "buzzard" and 
"scavenger" used by the prosecutor in this case do not even carry a criminal 
connotation. Nor are they words that improperly assailed, or even related to, 
Johnson's credibility. Compare, State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 716, 85 P.3d 
1109, 1175 (Ct. App. 2003) (calling defendant a "liar" improper, but not 
fundamental error). Rather, as Johnson himself appears to acknowledge on 
appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.44-45), the prosecutor merely used the words as a 
metaphor to describe Johnson's behavior. Had Johnson's trial counsel believed 
the prosecutor's remarks so overstepped the bounds of permissible argument as 
to potentially deprive her client of a fair trial, any error could easily have been 
remedied by a timely objection and the giving of a curative instruction. 
Johnson's counsel apparently had no such belief, however, because, rather than 
objecting, she elected to address the prosecutor's comments and make specific 
use of them during her own argument (Tr., p.336, Ls.15-19 (referring to 
prosecutor's buzzard analogy), p.346, L.8 - p.347, L.5 (arguing the util~ty of 
buzzards in nature)), even going so far at one point as to say, "Being a buzzard 
is not a bad thing" (Tr., p.347, L.5). That Johnson's trial counsel elected to make 
use of the prosecutor's terminology instead of object or move for a mistrial when 
the comments were made is a strong indication that trial counsel made a tactical 
choice, and did not believe that any error denied Johnson a fair trial. That 
appellate counsel now wishes to change tactics does not show fundamental 
error. 
D. Johnson Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Misstated His 
Testimonv, Much Less That The Alleqed Misstatements Constitute 
Fundamental Error 
In arguing to the jury that the evidence showed Johnson knowingly 
disposed of stolen property, the prosecutor stated that Officer Milovanovic and 
Johnson "both I.D. the third batch that came in [to Pacific Steel] as Union Pacific 
Railroad wire." (Tr., p.318, Ls.16-18.) She also argued that, on the day of his 
arrest, Johnson admitted knowing the wire in his possession "was probably 
stolen." (Tr., p.324, Ls.15-20.) Johnson contends on appeal that these 
arguments misstated his testimony and "created the false impression that the 
State had direct evidence in the form of a confession as to the element of Mr. 
Johnson's purported knowledge that the wire was stolen." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.45-46.) Johnson's argument is unavailing because a review of the record 
shows no fundamental error, or even error at all, in relation to the complained of 
arguments. 
Johnson testified at trial and specifically denied knowing either that any of 
the wire he sold to Pacific Steel was UPR property or that it was stolen. (Tr,, 
p.273, L.23 - p.274, L.13, p.299, L.8 - p.300, L.7.) However, when asked to 
identify the third batch of wire he sold to Pacific Steel on October 22, 2007, 
Johnson readily admitted that the wire he sold was the same wire Officer 
Milovanovic had photographed in a Pacific Steel recycling bin (Tr., p.281, L . l l  - 
p.284, L.1), wire that had previously been identified by the officer as UPR 
number six signal wire (Tr., p.142, Ls.4-18, p.144, Ls.2-3, p.147, Ls.9-21). In 
arguing the significance of Johnson's testimony the prosecutor did not, as 
Johnson suggests on appeal, represent that the testimony constituted an 
admission by Johnson that he knew the wire was UPR property when he 
disposed of it. Rather, in arguing that Johnson had "I.D.'d" the third batch of wire 
as UPR wire, the prosecutor was only accurately pointing out that Johnson had 
identified it as such at trial. The argument was a fair comment on the evidence 
and did not misstate Johnson's testimony. 
The prosecutor's argument regarding Johnson's admissions to Officer 
Milovanovic was also a fair characterization of the evidence presented at trial. 
Officer Milovanovic testified that, when Johnson was arrested on October 24, 
2007, he had "quite a bit of' UPR number six and number ten signal wire in his 
vehicle. (Tr., p.153, Ls.5-23.) When questioned about that wire, Johnson told 
the officer that "he knows its wrong, but it got caught on his truck, that he didn't 
actually cut it down." (Tr., p.162, Ls.6-15.) 
During closing, the prosecutor characterized the substance of Johnson's 
admissions to Officer Milovanovic as knowing the wire "was probably stolen." 
(Tr., p.324, Ls.15-18.) Johnson argues on appeal that this was error because, 
he contends, there is a difference between knowing it was "wrong" to take the 
wire and knowing it was "probably stolen." (Appellant's brief, pp.45-46.) 
Johnson's argument fails because the prosecutor was entitled to argue 
reasonable inferences from the evidence, a, Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 
P.3d at 969, and the reasonable inference arising from Johnson's admission that 
he knew it was "wrong" to take the wire is that he also knew the wire was not his 
to take, i.e., it was stolen. Moreover, Johnson's trial counsel apparently did not 
believe the difference between "wrong" and "stolen" was anything more than one 
of semantics because she, too, characterized the substance of Johnson's 
admission to the officer as knowing the wire "was stolen." (Tr., p.368, Ls.1-3.) 
Johnson has failed to establish error in relation to the prosecutor's argument 
Finally, Johnson's argument on appeal that the prosecutor created the 
, . 
false impression that Johnson's admissions related to the wire he sold to Pacific 
Steel, rather than to the wire that was in his possession when he was arrested, is 
itself a mischaracterization of the prosecutor's argument. The prosecutor 
actually argued: 
We also have the arrest on the 24'h by ... Officer 
Milovanovic. He assists in the arrest with the defendant, finds all of 
this copper wire in the back of his truck. The copper wire that the 
defendant said, oh, yeah, I ran over that copper wire too when I 
was out there. And this time it was already cut up for me so I didn't 
have to do anything. I just put it in the back of my truck. 
Well, according to the officer, after the defendant had 
waived his Miranda rights, he made admissions to the officer. 
yeah, I knew it was probably stolen. Yeah, but I didn't cut it down. 
That was his response. I knew I shouldn't have had it, but I'm not 
the one that cut it down. 
(Tr., p.324, Ls.7-20.) It is clear, in context, that the prosecutor specifically tied 
Johnson's admission to the wire in his possession on the day of his arrest. 
Although the prosecutor ultimately asked the jury to infer from that admission 
that Johnson also knew the wire he sold to Pacific Steel between October 4th and 
October 22"d was stolen (see Tr., p.318, L.25 - p.325, L.5), she never 
represented to the jury that Johnson had made any inculpatory statements about 
the wire that was the subject of the grand theft charge in this case. 
Because a review of the record shows that the prosecutor did not 
mischaracterize the evidence, Johnson has failed to show any error, much less 
fundamental error that deprived him of a fair trial. 
v. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine 
Is Applicable To This Case 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 ldaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Johnson has failed to 
show that two or more errors occurred and, as such, has failed to show that the 
doctrine of cumulative error is a~plicable to this case. See, e.&, LaBelle v. 
State, 130 ldaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in 
the trial had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that 
would require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 ldaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 ldaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. 
App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless). 
VI. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Award Of Restitution 
A. Introduction 
Johnson argues the district court erred when it awarded restitution in the 
amount of $2000. (Appellant's brief, pp.48-49.) His argument is unavailing. The 
restitution award is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion. 
5. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within 
the discretion of a trial court." State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 
280 (Ct. App. 2007). "The detqrmination of the amount of restitution is a 
question of fact for the trial court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported 
by substantial evidence." Id. (citing State v. Hamilton, 129 ldaho 938, 943, 935 
P.2d 201, 206 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The Restitution Award Is Supported By Substantial Evidence 
Idaho's restitution statute authorizes trial courts to award restitution for the 
actual economic loss suffered by crime victims as a result of the defendant's 
criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304(2) and (7); Smith, 144 ldaho at 692, 169 P.3d 
at 280. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a), ... economic loss "includes, but is not 
limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses." See also Smith, 144 
ldaho at 692, 160 P.3d at 280. For purposes of determining the amount of 
restitution to be ordered, the term "value" means "the market value of the 
property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily 
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time 
after the crime." I.C. §§ 18-2402(11)(1) and 19-5304(1)(c); Smith, 144 ldaho at 
692, 160 P.3d at 280. Also for purposes of determining restitution, value need 
only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. 3 19-5304(6). 
Johnson's argument on appeal that the district court abused its discretion 
in awarding UPR $2000 in restitution is based entirely upon his faulty assertion 
that "the fair market value of the wires alleged to have been stolen was 
measured by the price that was paid by Pacific Steel and Recycling - $665.05." 
(Appellant's brief, p.49.) For the reasons set forth in Section II(C), supra, the 
state presented substantial evidence at trial from which court could conclude that 
there is no market for signal wire that has been destroyed and, as such, 
replacement cost was the appropriate method of valuation. Also for the reasons 
set forth in Section II(C), supra, the state presented substantial evidence that the 
replacement value of the stolen wire was $2000. Because the evidence at trial 
supports the court's award of restitution, Johnson has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
order of restitution. 
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APPENDIX A 

INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption 
places upon the State the burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, a Defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no 
evidence against the Defendant. If, after considering all the evidence and my 
instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt, you 
must return a verdict of not guilty. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because 
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt. It is the State of the case which, after the entire 
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the 




INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be carried by the 
State of Idaho do not require the State to prove every fact and every circumstance put 
in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof extends only to the 





INSTRUCTION NO. 13-A 
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of Theft by Possession of Stolen Property, 
the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about or between October 4, 2007 and October 22,2007, 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Lonnie Johnson knowingly disposed of stolen property, to 
wit: copper wire, 
4. either knowing the property was stolen by another or under such 
circumstances as would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the 
property was stolen, 
5. such property was in fact stolen, and 
6. any of the following occurred: 
(a) the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the 
use or benefit of the property, or 
(b) the defendant knowingly used, concealed or abandoned the property in 
such manner as to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of 
the property, or 
(c) the defendant used, concealed, or abandoned the property knowing 
that such use, concealment or abandonment would have probably 
deprived the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property. 
Property is stolen when a person wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds it from 
the owner with the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate it to any 




INSTRUCTION NO. 13-C 
If the evidence shows that the defendant toolc, obtained, or withheld property by theft at 
various times from t11e sane  person; and that the value of the property taken in each theft was 
one thousand dollars ($1000) or less; and that the property was taken, obtained, or withheld 
pursuant to one overall illtent or plan to coinillit a series of thefts; then you are toadd together 
the values of all the property taken, obtained, or withheld pussuant to tliat overall illtent or plan. 
If the total value of such property is Inore t l~an one thousand dollars ($1000), then the crime is 
Grand Theft. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a theft is grand 




INSTRUCTION NO. 13-F 
The tern1 "value" as used in these instructions means as follows: 
The inarlcet value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if the marltet value 
callnot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacelllent of the property witllin a 
reasonable tiine after the crime. 
When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to any of the 
above standards its value shall be deeilled to be one thousand dollars ($1000) or less. 

